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- 14/12/2009, 21:10 #1
Ryanair B738 tailstrike at Dublin
A Ryanair Boeing 737-800, registration EI-DYD performing flight FR-208 from Dublin (Ireland) to London Stansted,EN (UK) with 148 passengers and 6 crew, struck its tail onto Dublin's runway 28. The crew continued the takeoff, climbed to FL120, where the crew donned their oxygen masks due to loss of cabin pressure, declared emergency and descended with ATC clearance for a return to Dublin, where the airplane landed safely on runway 28 21 minutes after departure.
The Irish AAIU released their final report concluding that:
the aircraft was depressurised manually at FL120 by the Flight Crew while carrying out a Non-Normal Checklist subsequent to a low-severity tailstrike event.
Contributory Causes were:
- Allowing the aircraft to climb and pressurise while the nature of the problem was not clearly established.
- Actioning a Non-Normal Checklist without fully appreciating the consequences of such action.
The captain was pilot flying to the sector to Stansted, a non-derated takeoff with flaps 5 was planned. The airplane was cleared to climb to FL230 on departure. While the airplane rotated for takeoff, the flight crew became aware of a bump but were not sure what had occured. After the after takeoff checklists had been processed and the airplane was in a stable climb, the captain handed controls to the first officer to permit the captain assess the problem, which took about 4 minutes, during which the airplane climbed through 10000 feet. The captain came to the conclusion, that a tailstrike had most likely occured and contacted a flight attendant, who confirmed a tail strike had occured. The captain resumed the role of the pilot flying and called for the Non-Normal Checklist (NNC) "tailstrike on takeoff". The airplane climbed to FL120 and remained on that level for about 40 seconds, then commenced a descent upon clearance by ATC.
While processing the NNC the pressurization outflow valve was opened to depressurize the cabin. As the airplane was not above 14000 feet, the passenger oxygen masks did not deploy automatically, the cabin altitude horn however sounded prompting the crew to don their oxygen masks before completing the checklist.
Cabin crew noticed that a depressurization had occured and attempted to raise the cockpit, however the flight crew was just busy donning their oxygen masks and didn't hear the call. After bumping the cockpit door the cabin crew called again and told the flight crew, that the cabin had depressurized but the oxygen masks had not dropped. The flight crew therefore released the oxygen masks manually.
The AAIU found the tail skid assembly had some superficial scoring on its shoe and the tail skid had not been compressed sufficiently to render the airplane unservieable. The green mark on the tail skid indicating, that the airplane was serviceable, remained visible.
The selection of flaps 5 gives a minimum tail clearance of 51cm on takeoff rotation on 737-800 and 737-900 types.
The captain said in post flight interviews, that cabin crew had alerted the cockpit of smoke in the cabin some time before the cabin altitude alert activated.
The AAIU analysed, that the center of gravity could not be determined with certainty however was within limits. The tailstrike in itsself was not a serious event in itsself, however developed into a serious incident through the following chain of events.
The commander was correct in handing controls to the first officer, however it would been more prudent to level off immediately at a safe altitude, fully identify the nature of the event and then complete the relevant checklists. At low altitude the opening of the outflow pressure valve would not have been problematic.
The NNC is designed to prevent the airframe from pressurizing in case, the airframe had received such damage that a sudden decompression could occur. As the airplane had already climbed to FL120 and had no damage, the execution of the NNC caused a depressurization of the aircraft. Had the crew considered the reesult of the checklist for a moment, they would have recognized, that the aircraft would be depressurized by the checklist items.
The AAIU also analysed, that it was apparent that only the cabin purses recognized the severity of the situation, when the cabin depressurized and took immediate correct action to inform the flight deck.
Two safety recommendations were issued to the operator as result of the investigation.
- 14/12/2009, 23:25 #2
joder.. imagino que por falta de experiencia..
- 14/12/2009, 23:36 #3
- 15/12/2009, 01:35 #4
Vete a saber por qué lo hubo, si una racha de viento, si calcularon Vr unos nudos por debajo...
El problema de haber subido tanto radica quizás en los procedimientos de la compañía que no indicaban que no había que subir y presurizar la cabina; o quizás estuvo en los pilotos al no seguir el procedimiento al pie de la letra y seguir ascendiendo. En este último caso no es fallo por falta de experiencia, sino que quizás lo es por un entrenamiento no adecuado en este punto en particular.
- 15/12/2009, 19:23 #5
- 12 feb, 08
Ufff volé hace nada en ese avión...
Edito: He leido el informe y parece que no sufrió ningun daño, pero siempre da un poco de cague.
Última edición por dtarraco; 15/12/2009 a las 19:59
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