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- 06/06/2009, 22:23 #31
- 27 mar, 09
- 06/06/2009, 22:36 #32____________________
"Papá, dejé mi corazón ahí arriba". -
Gary Powell describiendo su primer vuelo con 14 años.
Siempre volarás a nuestro lado.
- 06/06/2009, 22:45 #33
jaja, ya me cae bien el rusindus...ha sacado de sus casillas a la plana mayor en menos de 24 horas, todo un record!!!
- 06/06/2009, 23:26 #34
¿Porque no me sorprende?"Though I Fly Through the Valley of Death, I Shall Fear No Evil. For I am at 80,000 Feet and Climbing."
- 07/06/2009, 01:18 #35
- 07/06/2009, 01:33 #36
- 17 jun, 07
Cojo palomitas, que me voy a reir un rato.
- 07/06/2009, 07:44 #37
La verdad es que no sé si me estoy perdiendo álgo, y no me entero "de ná"... o qué... Hace poco, por ejemplo, en éste foro, éste "cacharro" ( ruso ) os gustaba a muchos...
Ahora, desde hace unos días, estoy viendo aquí una beligerancia antirusa que me está llamando la atención... Tiene que ver con la aviación, o estamos volviendo a los tiempos del NO-DO...
Con todos mis respetos a todos, estoy un poco perdido. Enviamos a Rusindus a Guantánamo?
Por favor, Oooohhhhmmmm, Relaxxxxxx... Acordaos de aquella aspirante a Miss España que hace unos años que decía: "Puessss Rusia es un pais maravilloso, lleno de gente maravillosa y no sé que más", Pues también ( ella no lo sabía ) hace unos "pájaros maravillosos"..
Si rencor, que me teneis asustado.
- 07/06/2009, 10:03 #38euscatGuest
Report: Ryanair B738 at Rome on Sep 7th 2005, loss of situational awareness and terrain clearanceBy Simon Hradecky, created Friday, May 29th 2009 19:15Z, last updated Friday, May 29th 2009 20:58ZThe crew of a Ryanair Boeing 737-800, registration EI-DAV performing flight FR-9672 from Dusseldorf Niederrhein (Germany) to Rome Ciampino (Italy) with 166 passengers, completely lost situational awareness around 12:20Z, after they had abandoned their approach to Rome's Ciampino Airport and decided to divert to Rome's Fiumicino Airport due to adverse weather. The crew began to miss ATC instructions and descended below assigned altitudes, getting into conflict with other traffic forced to descend further to 1000 feet, but descending below 1000 feet too and thus getting just about 454 feet above ground at a speed of 200 KIAS perpendicular to the approach path at one point before the crew aborted the approach. The crew was not able to approach Fiumicino as well and finally diverted to Pescara, where the airplane landed safely with just 1520 kg (3350 lbs) of fuel remaining.
The Italian National Agency for Aviation Safety ("Agenzia Nazionale per la Sicurezza del Volo", ANSV) concluded in their final report, that the cause of the serious incident was
- the incorrect operation and conduct of flight by the flight crew in adverse weather at the unplanned and unbriefed diversion to Rome's Fiumicino Airport.
- the captain's state of mind, who had lost his only son three months before after a long illness
- the progressing loss of situational awareness by the flight crew
- limited experience by the first officer
- poor cockpit resource management and crew cooperation
- inappropriate informations provided by air traffic control in non-standard language
- inadequate analysis of weather data by the flight crew
- incorrect use of onboard weather radar by flight crew
- absence of timely available ground radar based weather data in the Rome approach sectors
- absence of the minimum safe altitude warning on the approach radar of Rome's air traffic control
The ANSV was informed of the incident through the Irish AAIU (Aviation Accident Investigation Unit) on Jan 13th 2006 only and rated the incident as serious. The investigation was mainly conducted using the radar recordings. Cockpit voice recorders and flight data recorders were not available anymore several months after the incident. The information of interest had already been overwritten when the recorders were removed from the airplane on September 9th. The captain of the flight had in fact not tripped the circuit breaker for the recorders as required by company rules.
The crew consisted of a captain with a total flight time of 7400 hours, thereof 2300 hours on type, and a first officer with a total of 450 flight hours, thereof 300 hours on type.
The crew had conducted three sectors Rome Ciampino-Treviso-Ciampino-Dusseldorf on that day already. The crew had computed, that they needed 18000 lbs (8200kg) of fuel including 2100 lbs (950kg) of contingency fuel and including final reserve for the leg from Dusseldorf to Rome Ciampino.
Both crew were familiar with Ciampino having made about 25 flights into Ciampino the month before the incident.
The flight was without event until about 80nm before Rome, when the airplane entered a zone of thunderstorm formations requiring to deviate from the planned flight path to fly around cells.
The first officer inquired with air traffic control, whether any landings were in progress at Ciampino Airport and received the information, that three aircraft were diverting from Fiumicino Airport to Ciampino with one landing at Ciampino just in progress. The first officer requested weather for both Campino and the intended alternate airport at Pescara and was issued the according latest weather reports of both airfields. Subsequently he requested to be cleared directly to the outer marker of Ciampino Airport's runway 15 and was issued instructions to descend to FL90 direct outer marker and report the airfield in sight. Although the instruction was read back, the air traffic controller noticed, that the airplane was not turning towards the outer marker, but continued on the present heading. Inquiring with the flight crew he received an unclear response "We intercept ... to the outer marker and need further descent RYR 9672". The controller cleared the airplane to descend to 6000 feet QNH 1016 expedite descent.
When the airplane was about 13nm from the outer marker with a ground speed of 260 knots, air traffic control advised the crew, that due to wind changes now producing 25 knots of tailwind at Ciampino the runway had to be changed to runway 33. The crew reported (at position C approach Ciampino), that they'd be able to perform a visual approach runway 33. The crew was advised to be number 2 in the landing sequence, maintain 6000 feet. At position D approach Ciampino the aircraft turned left onto a heading of 170 degrees, however the controller needing more spacing ordered the airplane to perform a 360 (complete circle) to the left. The instruction was read back and the airplane began to turn, but then the crew reported they were unable to complete the turn due to a thunderstorm cell and becoming non-visual (position E). The airplane required a heading of 050 degrees to remain clear of cloud. 2 minutes later the crew requested to turn right due another cell on their left and was cleared to a heading of 150 (position F). After a frequency change the crew reported on the new frequency, that they were at 6000 feet at a heading of 130. The controller asked, whether they could accept a right hand turn onto final, but the crew declined and requested a left hand turn. The crew was cleared to a heading of 250. A minute later the crew requested to descend to 3000 feet, the controller declined pointing out that MSA (minimum safe altitude) was 6000 feet at their position. Another minute later the crew reported, that they had the airfield in sight and requested to descend to 5000 feet. The crew inquired, whether there was any traffic into the airfield. The controller replied, that there was no traffic on both runways 15 or 33, strongly advising the crew to maintain 5000 feet (minimum radar altitude) being below the top of Monte Cave (position H). 8 nautical miles from the runway threshold the crew reported, that they did not have the airfield in sight.
The wind changed again, however the controller did not relay the wind change. When the crew requested weather data again, the controller now reported winds from 130 degrees at 11 knots. The aircraft entered a zone of turbulence, the crew requested an immediate descent (position I). After the airplane went through the extended centerline of the runway, the crew requested to proceed direct VOR Pratica di Mare (PRA) and divert to Rome Fiumicino (position L). The airplane was cleared direct PRA maintain 5000 feet.
While approaching PRA the crew inquired, whether there had been any landings at Fiuminicino and received the reply, that two aircraft had landed within the last 5 minutes. Winds were reported from 050 degrees at 7 knots gusting 34 knots, visibility 4km, cumulonimbus clouds at 1500 feet. The crew preferred runway 34R - right - for the landing. At position 1 diversion track the crew was cleared to heading of 210 degrees, descend 4000 feet. At position 2 the crew inquired which runway was in use. The airplane was descending through 4700 feet at a ground speed of 235 knots. The controller cleared the airplane to turn right heading 310 to stabilize for the approach to runway 34L - left. The aircraft was at 4200 feet at 234 knots ground speed at position 3. Another flight had been assigned runway 34R, the controller got busy now to coordinate the approach. The Ryanair crew was not informed about the presence and proximity of the other aircraft as the controller was limited to only communicate the assigned runway. Instead of turning right as instructed the crew kept tracking on their previous heading 210 passing the extended centerline of runway 34R at an altitude of 4255 feet and 240 knots ground speed (position 4). At an altitude of 3880 feet and a speed of 240 knots the aircraft began a turn to the right (position 5) and went through the extended centerline of runway 34L. The captain disengaged the autopilot due to turbulence and continued in manual mode. The controller reissued a turn right instruction for runway 34L, cleared the aircraft to 3000 feet and passed the crew onto the tower controller thanking the crew for their cooperation.
The crew missed the frequency change and requested to descend to 2000 feet on the approach frequency just as the airplane was going through the extended centerline of the runway at a heading of 040 degrees at an altitude of 2120 feet (position 6) below the assigned altitude at a speed of 255 knots. Because of the landing traffic for runway 34R the controller commanded the airplane to immediately descend to 1000 feet due to the presence of conflicting traffic at 2000 feet on a stabilised ILS approach to runway 34R. 30 seconds later the airplane went through the extended centerline of runway 34R at an altitude of 1650 feet on a heading of 030, now about 3nm behind the conflicting traffic (position 1 final). The controller told the crew, that they were about 8nm from the runway, the airplane was at an altitude of 1430 feet at 265 knots. The altitude 1430 feet was 770 feet lower than required to maintain the ILS approach profile at that distance according to the ILS approach chart for runway 34L. The controller however did not warn the crew about flying too low.
The aircraft was now turning left through a heading of 22 degrees at an altitude of 1300 feet now 900 feet below approach profile (position 2 final). At that point the captain reported they had encountered a violent downward current (microburst). The controller advised a few seconds later, that the airplane had 6nm to the runway and needed to be able to approach or climb. The crew replied to climb and go-around. 20 seconds later the aircraft had reached an altitude of 735 feet (1200 feet below approach profile) at a heading of 335 degrees and a speed of 245 knots over ground (position 3 final). The controller reported 5nm to the airfield and told the crew their runway was 34R - right. The crew reported that they had begun to climb again. About 40 seconds later the airplane went again through the extended centerline of runway 34R at an altitude of 454 feet (900 feet below approach profile), a speed of 200 knots and a heading of 284 degrees (position 4 final). The pilot now decided to divert to Pescara and finally aborted the approach to Fiumicino.
The airplane landed safely in Pescara 25 minutes later with 1520 kg of fuel remaining on board.
The commander told the ANSV in interviews, that he had not informed his company about the loss of his son fearing, he might lose his job. After the incident flight he also conducted the ferry flight from Pescara to Ciampino without notifying anybody what had happened on the previous flight.
The commander told the ANSV in interviews, that he had not informed his company about the loss of his son fearing, he might lose his job. After the incident flight he also conducted the ferry flight from Pescara to Ciampino without notifying anybody what had happened on the previous flight
- 07/06/2009, 10:50 #39
iros con las discusiones personales a la taberna, si no os importa esto es un foro de aviación y no un patio de recreo de dos niños diciéndose "tú más"
- 07/06/2009, 11:06 #40"Though I Fly Through the Valley of Death, I Shall Fear No Evil. For I am at 80,000 Feet and Climbing."
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